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\title{Sentences}
\author{Porphyry \and Thomas Davidson (tr.)\footnote{T.~Davidson, ``The
Sentences of Porhyry the Philosopher,'' in \textit{The Journal of Speculative
Philosophy,} vol.~3, 1869.} \and @sdi (ed.)\footnote{I have lightly edited the
text for textual errors and readability (referencing T.~Taylor, ``Auxiliaries
to the Perception of Intelligible Natures,'' in \textit{Select Works of
Porphyry}, 1823; and J.~Dillon, ``Pathways to the Intelligible,'' in
\textit{Porphyre: Sentences,} 2005).}}
\date{}

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\paragraph{1} All body is in space: no one of the things which in themselves
are incorporeal, or anything of such nature, is in space.

\paragraph{2} The things which in themselves are incorporeal, from the fact
that they are superior to all body and space, are everywhere; not in a
sundered, but in an undivided condition.

\paragraph{3} The things which in themselves are incorporeal are not locally
present in bodies, but are present in them when they wish, inclining to them in
the manner in which it is their nature to incline. But though not locally
present to them, they are present by relation.

\paragraph{4} The things which in themselves are incorporeal are not present in
reality and es\-sence; for they are not commingled with bodies; but by the
existence consequent upon their inclination, they impart a certain power which
is immediate to the bodies. For the inclination gives existence to a second
power, which is immediate to bodies.

\paragraph{5} The soul is a somewhat mediate between the es\-sence which is
undivided, and, as regards bodies, divided. But the intellect is undivided
es\-sence only; bodies are divided only; qualities and material species are
concerned with bodies as divided.

\paragraph{6} That which acts upon something else, does not do what it does by
approach or contact: but even those things which do perform an action by
approach and contact, employ approach by accident.

\paragraph{7} [The] soul is bound down to the body by adverting to the passions
arising from it, and it is loosed again by impassivity to it.

\paragraph{8} What Nature has bound, Nature also looses; and what the soul has
bound, that it also looses. Now Nature bound the body in the soul; but the soul
bound itself in the body. Nature, accordingly, looses the body from the soul;
but the soul looses itself from the body.

\paragraph{9} Death, therefore, is twofold, that which is generally recognized,
when the body separates from the soul; and that of the saints, when the soul
separates from the body. And the one does not at all follow the other.

\paragraph{10} All things are in all, but each in a manner consonant with the
es\-sence of each: in intellect, intellectually; in soul, logically; in plants,
seminally; in bodies, phantasmically; and in what transcends these,
inconceivably and superessentially.

\paragraph{11} The incorporeal existences in descending are divided and
multiplied into atomic things by a remission of power, whilst in ascending they
are unified, and revert to inseparateness by superabundance of power.

\paragraph{12} Not only in bodies is there ambiguity [variety of things
included under a common name], but life also is of those things that are in
many ways. For the life of a plant is one, that of an animal another; that of
the intellectual is one, that of (the nature of) the transcendent another. One
belongs to the soul, another is intellectual. For these things also live, even
although no one of the things that exist from them possesses similar life.

\paragraph{13} Every thing that generates from its own es\-sence generates
something inferior to itself, and everything that has been generated adverts by
nature to that which generated it. But of the things which generate, some do
not advert at all to the things generated, while some partly do and partly do
not advert, and some advert only to the products from not adverting to
themselves.

\paragraph{14} Everything generated from another contains the cause of the
generation, since indeed nothing is generated without a cause. But of things
generated, those that possess being through composition (synthesis) would for
this very reason be destructible; whereas those things which, being simple and
incomposite, possess being in the simple [fact] of existence, being
indissoluble, are also indestructible, and are said to be generated, not
because they are composite, but because they depend on some cause. Bodies,
therefore, are generated in two senses, i.~e.~they either depend upon a cause
which produces them, or they are composite. Soul and intellect are generated
things, only as depending upon a cause, not as being composite. Some bodies,
therefore, are generated and dissoluble and destructible; others are
ungenerated in so far as they are incomposite, and hence indissoluble and
indestructible, but generated as depending upon a cause.

\paragraph{15} Intellect is not the beginning of all things; for intellect is
many. But before the many there must be the one. And that intellect is many is
evident; for it always thinks thoughts which are not one, but many, and are not
other than it. If, then, it is [one and] the same with them, and they are many,
the intellect also must be many: and that it is the same with its intelligibles
[objects of thought] is shown thus. For if there is anything which
contemplates, it must contemplate what is contained in itself as such, or as
placed in another. And what does contemplate is plain, for along with thinking
there must be intellect. Being deprived of thinking, it is deprived of
es\-sence. Wherefore, directing our attention to those states which are
incident upon cognitions, we must trace out its intuition. And the cognitive
powers in us are, in general terms, perception, imagination, intellect. That
which extends its activity to external things by means of perception,
contemplates by contact, not by union with the things which it contemplates,
but merely receiving a representation of them from its application to them.
When, therefore, the eye sees the seen, it is impossible that it should have
come into identity with the seen; for it would not see if it were not at a
distance. In a similar manner, that which is touched would be destroyed by
coming into identity. From which it is evident that both perception and that
which uses perception are always directed outward, if they are to seize the
perceptible. Similarly also the imagination is always directed outward, and by
its tension it brings into dependent existence an image, or, in other words, it
prepares outside, by its very tension outwards, an exhibition of the image as
being without. And the act of seizing by these powers is such, that none of
them, by converging or contracting into itself, would meet with either
perceptible or imperceptible form; whereas in the case of the intellect, the
act of seizing is not in this manner, but [takes place] by its converging into
itself, and contemplating itself. For by going beyond the viewing of its own
energies, and beyond being the eye of its own energies, and the spectacle of
es\-sences, it would think nothing. Thus then, in the same manner, as there are
[as we have seen] perception and perceptible [object of perception], so also
there are intellect and intelligible. The former contemplates, by extending
outwards, finding the perceptible contained in matter. But the intellect does
so by drawing together into itself, and not at all by extending outwards;
although some have held the contrary, thinking that there was merely a
difference of name between the existence of the intellect and that of the
imagination; for the imagination in the logical animal had appeared to them
action of intellect. But for those who make all things depend upon matter and
corporeal nature, the logical conclusion is that intellect also depends on
these. Whereas intellect, in our sense, is the spectator of corporeal and other
es\-sences. Where, then, shall it find and seize them? Since they are things
outside of matter, they cannot be anywhere. It is manifest, therefore, that
intellectual things must be connected with action of intellect. And hence, if
intellectual things are for the intellect, it will contemplate both the
intelligible and itself in thinking intelligible things. And withdrawing into
itself, it thinks through withdrawing into these. And since intelligible things
are many (for the intellect thinks many and not one) the intellect itself must
be many. But before the many lies the one, so that the one must be prior to
intellect.

\paragraph{16} The memory is not a conserver of imaginations, but of those
things which have been meditated to be put forward anew as problems.

\paragraph{17} The soul contains the reasons of all things, and energizes
according to them, either when provoked to outward effort by something else, or
when directing itself inward upon them. And when called out by something else,
it extends its perceptions as to things without; but sinking into itself,
towards intellect, it becomes engaged as in the acts of intellect. Therefore,
neither are the perceptions nor the acts of intellect outside of the
imagination, one might say; [nor is perception or action of intellect anything
else. Further,] as in the animal, perceptions do not take place without an
affection of the perceptive organs, so the acts of intellect do not take place
without imagination; or, to keep up the analogy, as impression is an
accompaniment of the perceptive animal (animality) so the image of the animal
accompanies the intellectual action of the soul.

\paragraph{18} The soul is an es\-sence without magnitude, immaterial,
indestructible, with life which has living from itself, possessing being.

\paragraph{19} The affection of bodies is one, that of incorporeals another.
For the affection of bodies is accompanied with change, whereas the intimacies
and affections of the soul are energies, which have no similarity to the
heatings and coolings of bodies. Wherefore, if the affection of bodies is
always accompanied with change, we must affirm that all incorporeal things are
impassive. For the things that are separate from matter and from bodies are [as
we saw] the same \textit{in actuality;} whereas those things which approach
matter and bodies are themselves impassive, and those in which they are
contemplated are affected. For whenever the animal perceives, the soul
resembles a separate harmony, moving the strings in tune out of itself; while
the body resembles the harmony in the strings, which is inseparate. The cause
of the moving is the animal, and this from its being endowed with life. It (the
animal) may be compared to the musician [who moves the strings], from being
endowed with harmony. The bodies affected by a perceptive affection resemble
the tuned strings. For there the harmony, which is separate, is not affected,
but the string. And the musician moves [the strings] according to the harmony
which is in him. Surely the string would not be moved musically, even if the
musician wished, unless the harmony dictated it.

\paragraph{20} The names of incorporeal things are not imposed from community
in one and the same genus, in the same manner as [those of] bodies are, but
from their naked privation with respect to bodies. Hence they are not
prevented, some from being existent, others from being non-existent. Thus some
are before bodies, and some with bodies; some are separate from bodies, and
some inseparate; some are existent by themselves, and some require others in
order to be; some are the same with energies and self-moved lives, and some for
their lives depend upon particular energies. For it is from a negation of what
they are not, and not from a positing of what they are, that they are named.

\paragraph{21} The properties of matter, according to the ancients, are these:
[It is] incorporeal, because it is other than bodies; lifeless, because it is
neither intellect nor soul, nor aught living in itself; formless, other,
infinite, impotent. Wherefore it is not even existent, but non-existent. It is
not a non-existent as motion is, but a veritable non-existent. It is an image
and phantom of mass; because it is that which is primitively in mass, it is the
impotent, it is a striving for existence, a posited not in position, a somewhat
always appearing its opposite in itself; small and great, less and greater,
deficient and excessive; always becoming, and not remaining, nor yet able to
flee; the deficiency of all the existent. Hence, in all that it professes, it
lies. Even though it appear great, it is small; for it is like a toy, fleeing
to the non-existent. For its flight is not in place, but in desertion from the
existent. Hence, the images in it are in a worse image. As in a looking-glass,
what is situated in one place is what appears in another. And it is full to
appearance, while it contains nothing and seems everything.

\paragraph{22} The affections all relate to that to which destruction relates.
For the admission of affection is the path to destruction, and destruction
belongs to that to which affection belongs. But none of the incorporeal things
perish. And some of them either are or are not, so that they are not at all
affected. For that which is affected must not be of this character, but
susceptible of becoming other, and of being destroyed by the qualities of those
things which assail it and impart the affection. For that which is in a thing
cannot be changed by anything that happens. Hence, for example, matter is not
affected; for in itself it is without quality; nor are the forms which it
takes, and which go in and come out. But the affection has relation to
composition, and belongs to that which has its being in composition; for it is
this that is contemplated as suffering amid opposite forces, and the qualities
of those things which assail it and cause affection. Hence, also, those things
whose life is from without and not from themselves are capable of being
affected by living and not living. Those things whose being is in an impassive
life, must necessarily remain in life; just as affection does not belong to
lifelessness, as far it is lifelessness. As, then, change and affection are in
the composite, or what is made up of matter and form, as we saw that body is,
whereas the same is not true of matter: so also living and dying, and
affections of this kind are conceived in the compound of soul and body. This,
of course, does not happen to the soul, for it is not a thing composed of
lifelessness and life, but of life and that alone. And it is so from being
simple es\-sence, and because the reason of the soul is self-moved.

\paragraph{23} The intellectual es\-sence is homogeneous, so that the things
which are, are in the universal soul and in the particular. But in the
universal even particulars are universally, whereas in the particular even
universals as well as particulars are particularly.

\paragraph{24} The death of the es\-sence whose being is in life, and whose
affections are lives, must itself lie in a kind of life, not in an absolute
deprival of life; for the lifelessness in it is not an affection or path to
non-living altogether.

\paragraph{25} In the case of incorporeal lives progressions take place, while
the former ones remain firm and immovable, and do not lose anything of
themselves into the existence of things below them, or change in anything. So
that not even the things called into existence are so called with any loss or
change; nor is this aught begotten, like generation, which partakes of decay
and change. They are, therefore, ungenerated and indestructible, and, in this
sense, begotten ungeneratedly and indestructibly.

\paragraph{26} In regard to that which transcends intellect, much is said in
accordance with the acts of intellect; but it is contemplated by the absence
rather than the presence of intellectual action. Just as many things are said
in regard to the sleeping-state, through waking, whereas it is only through
sleeping that cognition and comprehension [of sleep] are. For like is known by
like, since all knowledge is an assimilation of the known.

\paragraph{27} Non-being we partly produce by being separated from being,
partly preconceive by adhering to being. For, of course, if we are separated
from being, we do not preconceive the non-being that is above being: but we
give birth to a false feeling, that, namely, which takes place in the case of a
person who goes beyond himself [rises into ecstasy]. For every individual, as
being actually and through himself, must have the capability of being carried
up to the non-being which is above being, and along to the non-being which is
the decease of being.

\paragraph{28} To that which is in itself incorporeal, the existence of the
body offers no obstacle preventing it from being where it chooses and as it
pleases. For as that which has no mass is inapprehensible to body, and is
nothing in relation to it, so also that which has mass cannot come in the way
of the incorporeal, and stands to it as non-being. Neither locally does the
incorporeal move where it chooses (for space is an attribute of mass); nor is
it confined by the presence of bodies; whereas whatever is in any way in mass
can be confined and makes transition locally. That which is altogether without
mass is also without magnitude, incapable of being seized by those things which
are in mass, having no participation in local motion. Accordingly it is found
in a sort of relation, wheresoever it is related, being everywhere and nowhere.
Hence it is by a sort of relation that it is contained, either beyond heaven,
or in some part of the cosmos. But when it is contained in any part of the
cosmos, it is not seen by the eyes, but its presence becomes manifest from its
acts.

\paragraph{29} When we say that the incorporeal is contained in body, we do not
mean that it must be shut up like wild animals in a cage, for nothing corporeal
can shut up or embrace it; nor as a skin-bottle contains liquid or air; but it
must [be supposed to] call into existence powers which incline from unity as
related to it, outward, and by which then it descends and is interwoven with
bodies. Its coercion into body, therefore, is through an ineffable extension.
But neither does anything else bind it down, but it does so itself. In the same
manner it does not free the body when broken down and decayed, but it frees
itself by turning away from passivity [to the body].

\paragraph{30} Of es\-sences which are whole and perfect no one turns towards
its own offspring. But all the perfect es\-sences are carried up to the things
which produced them, from the cosmic body upwards. For it, being perfect, is
carried up toward the soul, which is intellectual. And for this reason it moves
in a circle. And the soul of it [is carried up] toward intellect, and intellect
again toward the First. All things, therefore, make their transitions toward
it, beginning at the extreme end, each according to its powers. But the ascent
towards the First is, nevertheless, either immediate or mediate. Hence these
things might be said not only to strive after the deity, but to partake of him
according to their power. On the other hand, it is an attribute of divided
existences, and those which are able to incline to many things, to turn toward
their offspring. Hence, also, in these there must have been error, in these
scoffing unbelief. These, then, matter defiles, because they are capable of
turning to it, while having the power to be turned toward the divine. So
perfection makes a separation of existence between the second and the first,
preserving those which are turned towards the first things, whereas
imperfection turns the first even toward the last, and makes them love those
things which turned away (lapsed) before them.

\paragraph{31} God is every where because nowhere; and intellect is everywhere
because nowhere; and soul is everywhere because nowhere. But God is everywhere
and nowhere among the things that are after him; and he is there only as he is
and desires. Again, intellect is in God, and everywhere and nowhere among the
things that are after it. And soul is in intellect and in God everywhere, and
nowhere in body; and body also is in soul and in God. And since all things that
are and that are not are from God and in God, he is not the things that are and
that are not, nor is he in them. For if he were only everywhere he would be all
and in all; but since he is also nowhere, all things are produced from him and
in him, because he is everywhere, and are other than he, because he is nowhere.
Thus also intellect, being everywhere and nowhere, is the cause of souls and
the things that are after them. And itself is not soul or the things after
soul, nor is it in these, inasmuch as it is not only everywhere in the things
that are after it, but also nowhere. And the soul is not body or in body, but
the cause of body, because, while being everywhere in the body, it is nowhere.
And the progress of the Universe is to that which is capable of being neither
everywhere at once nor nowhere, but which partakes partially of both [modes].

\paragraph{32} As it is a property of soul to be upon the earth (not to walk
upon the earth as bodies do) and to preside over body, which does walk on the
earth, so also it is the property of soul to be in Hades when it presides over
a shade, whose nature it is to be in space, but which possesses its es\-sence
in darkness. So that if Hades is a dark subterranean place, the soul, though
not abstracted from being, comes into Hades, drawing the shade after it. For
when it has gone out from the solid body, the spirit which it has collected to
it from the spheres follows it. But as, from its sympathy with the body, it has
its reason, as a partial one, projected, according to which it had its
connection with such and such a body in living, from this sympathy an
impression of the imagination is imparted to the spirit and thus it draws the
shade to it. It is said to be in Hades because the spirit partakes of the
invisible nature, and the murky one. And since the heavy, humid spirit passes
down even to the subterranean places, the soul itself is said to depart under
ground: not because the same es\-sence traverses places, and comes into places,
but because it adopts the relations of bodies whose nature it is to traverse
places, and to have places assigned to them, such and such bodies receiving it
according to their aptitudes, from their particular disposition toward it. For,
according to the manner in which it is disposed, it finds a body determined in
rank and properties. Hence, with a soul more purely disposed is united the body
approaching the immaterial, viz.~the {\ae}therial one; while with one who has
gone beyond reason into the projection of the imagination is united the solar
one, and with one that has become effeminate and is impassioned after form, the
lunar one is connected. After it it has lapsed into bodies, when, to accord
with its shapelessness, there have risen appearances composed of humid vapors,
there follows complete ignorance of being, and darkening, and childishness. And
indeed also in its egress, when it still has its spirit defiled through the
humid evaporation, it draws to it a shadow and is weighed down, inasmuch as
such a spirit by nature hastens to depart to a recess of the earth, if no other
reason draws it back. For just as the soul which wears the terrene shell must
adhere to the earth, so also one that draws to it a humid spirit must wear a
shade. And it draws a humid one to it when it studies continually to hold
converse with nature, whose operations are in the humid, and mostly
subterraneous. But when it studies to withdraw from nature, it becomes a dry
splendor, shadowless, cloudless. For humidity in the atmosphere forms cloud,
whereas dryness produces from vapor dry splendor.

\paragraph{33} These are the things which can be affirmed with truth regarding
the perceptible and the material: that it is universally diffused, that it is
changeable, that it has its es\-sence in otherness, that it is composite, that
it has [no] existence in and for itself, that it is intuited in place and in
mass, and so forth. On the other hand, [the things that can be affirmed] of
that which essentially is, are, that it exists in and for itself; that it is
always situated within itself, and similarly that it always is in the same
manner; that its es\-sence is invested with identity; that it is unchangeable
in its es\-sence; that it is incomposite, indissoluble, and not in place, or
diffused into mass; that it neither becomes nor decays, and so forth. Adhering
to these [distinctions], we ought not, in speaking, to make any confusion
between their different natures, or to listen to others when they in speaking
do so.

\paragraph{34} One set of virtues belongs to the citizen; another to the man
who aspires to the contemplative state and who is called for this reason
contemplative; another to the purified soul that is already in the
contemplative state; and finally are those of the intellect, in as far as it is
intellect purified from soul. Those of the citizen, consisting [as they do] in
moderation of passion, are to follow and to conform to the conclusions based
upon a calculation of what is proper or expedient in actions. Hence, because
they have in view a social organization which shall not inflict injury upon its
members, from the aggregation of the civil community they are called political.
And prudence is conversant with that which is reasoned; valor with the
passionate; temperance lies in the agreement and harmony of the desires and
affections with rational calculation; while justice is the simultaneous
limiting of each of these to its own sphere of action, in respect to ruling and
being ruled. On the other hand, the virtues of the man who tends to
contemplation lie in withdrawal from things here [below]; hence these are also
called purifications, being viewed as [consisting] in abstinence from actions
requiring the cooperation of the body, and from sympathies with it. For these
belong to the soul which withdraws toward true being. But the political virtues
adorn the mortal man, and the political ones are preparatives for the
purifications. For the man who is adorned with these must withdraw from doing
anything by predilection with the body. Hence in purifications, not to opine
with the body, but to energize, alone constitutes right thinking, and it is
perfected through thinking purely. Again, freedom from sympathies [with the
body] constitutes temperance. Not to fear, when withdrawing from the body, as
if it were into something empty and non-being, constitutes valor. And when
reason and intellect lead and nothing opposes, this is justice. The
disposition, therefore, which is based upon the political virtues may be stated
as consisting in moderation of passion, having for its aim to enable a man to
live as a man according to nature. The disposition based upon the contemplative
virtues consists in apathy, the end whereof is assimilation to God. But since
purification [has a twofold meaning], being either that which performs the
purifying function, or a property of those who are purified, the contemplative
virtues are viewed with reference to both the significations indicated of
purification. For they purify the soul, and are with it when it is purified.
For the end of purifying is to be purified. But since purifying and having been
purified are the removal of all that is alien, the good must be [something]
other than the purifying. For if previously to contamination the process of
being purified were good, purification would be sufficient. And purification
does suffice; but what remains after it is the good, not purification. But the
nature of the soul is not a good, but capable of partaking of the good, and
having the form of the good. But the good for it is to be united with that
which produced it, and evil for it is to be joined with what is after it. The
evil is twofold, [first,] the being united with these, and [secondly,] being so
with excess of passions. Hence all the political virtues, which free it at
least from one evil, have been called virtues and honorable ones. But the
purificatory virtues are more honorable, and free the soul from the evil which
belongs to it as soul. Wherefore, when it has purified itself, it must unite
with that which produced it. And virtue [predicable] of it after its adversion
(ascent) consists in cognition and knowing of that which is. Not that it does
not have this [knowledge] in itself, but because, without that which is before
it, it does not see the things of itself. There is, therefore, a third class of
virtues besides the purificative and political, those, namely, which belong to
the soul energizing intellectually. Wisdom and prudence lie in contemplation of
the things which intellect has, whereas justice is self-related action in the
progress toward intellect, and the energizing toward intellect. Temperance
again is the turning inward toward intellect. Fortitude is absence of passion,
in assimilation to that toward which it looks, and which is by nature
passionless. And these follow each other in turn, as others do. There is a
fourth species of virtues, namely, the pattern ones, which are in the
intellect. These are superior to those of the soul, and are the patterns of
those to which the similitudes of the soul belong. For intellect is that in
which all things are as patterns. Science is prudence; wisdom is the intellect
cognizing; self-relatedness, temperance; peculiar function, self-related
action. Valor is sameness, and a remaining pure in self-dependence, through
abundance of power. Four kinds of virtues, therefore, have been shown; [first,]
those which are of the intellect, exemplars, and concurrents of its es\-sence;
[second,] those of the soul already looking inward toward intellect, and filled
from it; [third,] those which belong to the soul of a man purifying itself, and
purified from the body and irrational passions; [fourth,] those belonging to
the soul of man which adorns the man, by setting limits to irrationality and
inculcating moderation of the passions. He who has the greater, has, of
necessity, the less; but by no means \textit{vice versa}. Moreover, from the
fact of having the less, he who has the greater will no longer energize
according to the less by predilection, but only in consequence of the
circumstance of birth. For, as has been said, they have a generic difference of
scope. The scope of the political ones is to set a limit to the passions as far
as regards the practical energies that have reference to nature; that of the
purificative ones is to free entirely from the passions; that of those which
relate to the intellect is to energize, without [those who practise them] ever
coming to a recollection of the freeing from the passions. The scope of the
others is in a manner analagous to those mentioned. Hence he who energizes
according to the practical virtues is a good neighbor; he who energizes
according to the purificative ones is a saint, or even a good spirit; he
who energizes according to those alone which relate to intellect is a god; and
he who energizes according to the pattern virtues is the father of the gods. We
ought, therefore, to direct our attention chiefly to the purificative virtues,
considering that the attainment of them is possible in this life. And it is
through them that the ascent to the more honorable virtues is. Hence we must
consider how far and to what extent purification can be carried. For it is a
withdrawal from the body and the irrational movements of the passions. How it
may be carried out and how far must be stated.

In the first place, then, the foundation, as it were, and basis of purification
is self-knowl\-edge---knowledge that one's soul is bound up with an alien
substance of different es\-sence.

In the second place, that which is seen from this basis is [how] to collect
oneself from the body, and that which, as it were, is extended in places, and
certainly stands in apathetic relation to it. For a person who energizes
continually according to sensation, even if he does not do so with sympathy and
enjoyment of pleasure, is, nevertheless, distracted by the body, being
connected with it through sensation. And we share in the pleasures or pains of
the objects of sense with a sympathetic inclination and approval. From which
disposition it is incumbent upon a man to purify himself above all things. And
this must take place if one partakes only of necessary pleasures, and of the
sensations only as far as is necessary for health, or as a relaxation from
labor, in order that he may not be fettered. Pains also must be removed; but if
this is not possible, they must be borne meekly, and diminished by withdrawal
of attention (sympathy) from them. Passion also, as far as possible, must be
taken away, and must not be brooded over at all. If this cannot be done, the
will, at least, must not be allowed to commingle with it, but must be free from
all preference for anything else. But the involuntary is weak and small. And
fear must be absent always, for a man must have no fear with regard to
anything. The involuntary applies here also. Nevertheless passion and fear must
be used in exhortation. Again, desire for everything evil must be exterminated.
And he will not indulge in food and drink, in as far as he is self. In [the
exercise of] the natural sexual passions the involuntary must have no part,
except to the extent of the sudden imagination which takes place during sleep.
In a word, let the intellectual soul of the man who is becoming purified be
itself pure from all these things. And let it desire that that which moves in
the direction of the irrationality of bodily appetites, be moved without
sympathy or attention, so that the movements may be cancelled immediately by
the presence of that which reasons. There will thus be no combat as the
purification progresses; but henceforth reason, being present, will suffice.
The inferior will reverence it, so that even the inferior itself will be
indignant, if it is at all excited, because it did not keep silence when its
master was present, and will reproach itself with weakness. These, then, are
the moderations of passion which assume a tendency toward the absence of
passion. And when the sympathetic has been thoroughly purged away, the
apathetic succeeds it, inasmuch as even the affection derived its movement from
the ratiocination which through inclination gives the key-note.

\paragraph{35} Everything, according to its own nature, is somewhere; if only
it is somewhere, it is not contrary to nature. For body, therefore, which
exists in matter and mass, to be somewhere is to be in place. Hence also for
the body of the world, which is material and in mass, being everywhere, is
being in extension and place of extension (distance), whereas for the
intellectual world, and generally for that which is immaterial and in itself
incorporeal, as being unconnected with mass and distance, there is no being in
space. So that for the incorporeal, ubiquity is not spatial; and, furthermore,
there is not one part of it here, and another part there. For in that case it
would not be outside space, or unextended; but it is entire wheresoever it is.
Nor is it present in one place and absent in another; for in this way it would
be comprehended by space; but it is withdrawn from the hither. Nor is it far
from this and near that. For the far and the near are spoken of as having
reference to things which are by their nature in space, to measurable
distances. So that the world is extendedly present to the intellectual, whereas
the incorporeal is present to the world undividedly and unextendedly. And the
undivided exists (becomes) entire in the extended, through every part, being
the same as one in number. In that, therefore, which is by nature multiplied
and magnified, the undivided and unmultiplied is magnified and multiplied; and
thus it partakes of it according to its own nature, not according to that of
the former. For the undivided and by nature unmultiplied, on the contrary, the
divided and multiplied is undivided and unmultiplied, and thus it is present to
it; that is to say, it is present without division or multiplication or
position, according to its own nature, to that which is divided and multiplied
and in space. But that which is divided and multiplied and in space is present
to the \textit{other} of these, which is external, without division or
multiplication or space. Hence in conducting our considerations, we must seize
the peculiarity (property) of each, and not confound their natures; especially
we must not imagine or fancy the things which are present to bodies, as
connected with the incorporeal. For no one must ascribe the properties of the
purely incorporeal to bodies. For with bodies every one has a familiarity; but
of the others (incorporeal things) one arrives at a knowledge with difficulty,
being undetermined with regard to them, and never coming in direct contact with
them so long as he is determined by imagination. You might state it thus:---If
the one is in space and outside of itself, inasmuch as it has passed over into
mass, the intelligible is not in space, and is in itself inasmuch as it has not
passed into mass. If the one is image, the other is archetype. The one
possesses being as in relation to the intelligible, the other in itself. For
every image is an image of intellect. So, remembering the properties of both,
we must not wonder at the interchange which takes place in their conjunction,
if indeed we can say conjunction at all; for we are not considering conjunction
of bodies, but of things that lie altogether outside of each other in the
properties of their existence. Hence, also, conjunction lies outside those
properties that are wont to be attributed to things of like es\-sence. There
is, therefore, neither fusion, nor mixture, nor conjunction, nor apposition;
but their mode is different, appearing on the occasion of the mutual
communications that take place in any manner between things of like es\-sence,
but lying outside of all the things that fall under perception. In infinite
parts, if the unextended, being present entire, meets the extended, it is
neither present as divided, giving part to part, nor, though multiplied, does
it present itself to multitude as manifold. But it is present to all the parts
of that which is in mass, to each unit of the mass, and to the whole mass and
the whole multitude without division or multiplication and as one in number.
But the partaking of it dividedly and discretely is the attribute of things
which have their power divided into parts, and to these it often happens that
they falsely cloak their own deficiency under the nature of another, and are at
a loss in regard to the es\-sence, which is wont to pass from its own [es\-sence]
into that of another.

\paragraph{36} True being is neither great nor small; for great and small are
attributes of mass properly. It lies outside the great and the small, and is
beyond the greatest and beyond the least, being the same as one in number;
although it is found to be partaken of by every greatest and every least.
Wherefore you must not conceive it as a maximum, otherwise you will be puzzled
as to how, being a maximum, it is present in the smallest masses without being
diminished or contracted; neither as a minimum, otherwise you will again be at
a loss to conceive how, being a minimum, it is present in the greatest masses
without multiplication or increase or extension. But taking together that which
goes beyond the greatest mass into a maximum, and the smallest mass into a
minimum, you will perceive how it is viewed at once in individuals and in
universals, by multitudes and masses, being the same and remaining within
itself. For it coexists with the magnitude of the world, according to its
own properties, without division or magnitude, and, notwithstanding its own
indivisibility, it comprehends the mass of the world and every part of the
world. So, again, the world in its manifold divisibility is conversant with it,
as divided into many parts, and as far as possible. Yet it is not able to
include it either totally or to the full extent of its power; but in everything
it encounters it as infinite, and incapable of being gone beyond; and this
principally for the reason that it is free from all mass.

\paragraph{37} That which is greater in mass is less in power, as compared, not
with similar genera, but with things different in species, or through otherness
of es\-sence. For as mass was seen to be a going outside of itself, and a
division of power into small particles, so, that which excels in power is alien
to all mass. For the power, returning into itself, is filled with itself, and
strengthening itself maintains its own might. In this manner body, passing over
into mass, departs, in diminution of power, from the power of incorporeal true
being, to the extent to which true being is not exhausted in mass, remaining in
the magnitude of power which is the same through absence of mass. Thus, as true
being has neither magnitude nor mass as related to mass, so the corporeal in
relation to true being is weak and powerless. For that which is greatest in
magnitude of power is destitute of mass. So that the world being everywhere,
and everywhere meeting true being---in the sense in which it is said to be
everywhere---can not comprehend the magnitude of power. But it meets it as
something not dividedly present to it, but present without magnitude or
limitation. The presence, therefore, is not spatial, but assimilative, as far
as it is possible for body to be assimilated to the incorporeal, and the
incorporeal to mirror itself in body assimilated to it. Hence also the
incorporeal is not present, in so far as the material cannot be assimilated to
the purely immaterial. And the incorporeal is present to the corporeal in so
far as it can be assimilated to it; not certainly by inception, for in that
case both would be cancelled, the material receiving the immaterial through
change into it, and the immaterial becoming material. Assimilations, therefore,
and participations of powers and impotences take place reciprocally between
things thus differing in es\-sence. So there is great distance between the
world and the power of being, and between being and the impotence of the
material. But that which lies between, assimilating and assimilated, uniting
the extremities, has been the cause of error in regard to the extremities, by
adding, through assimilation, dissimilars to the dissimilar.

\paragraph{38} True being is said to be many, not from difference of place, or
dimensions of mass, nor from accumulation, or from circumscription or
comprehension of divided parts; but from otherness, which is immaterial,
destitute of mass, and unmultiplied as regards discrete multiplicity. Hence it
is one, not as one body, or as in one place, or as one mass, or as one many;
inasmuch as, in so far as it is one, it is other; and its otherness is discrete
and united. For its otherness is not acquired from without, nor is it
adventitious, nor by participation in somewhat else, but it is many in itself.
For with all its energies it energizes, remaining (unchanged), inasmuch as it
constitutes its whole otherness through sameness, not reflecting itself in
difference between one [part] and another, as in the case of bodies. In the
case of these the opposite is true, and oneness consists in otherness,
otherness in them being the leading [characteristic], and oneness being
adventitiously superinduced from without. Whereas, in the case of being,
oneness and sameness are the first, and otherness is produced from the oneness,
being energetic. Wherefore the latter is multiplied in indivisibility, whereas
the former is unified in multitude and mass. The latter also is situated within
itself, being at one in itself; the former is never in itself, as having its
constitution in extension. Accordingly, the One is all-efficient
(universally-energetic), while multitude is in process of unification. Hence we
must examine closely how the latter is one and other, and again how the former
is multitude and one, and not interchange the properties of the one with those
which belong to the other.

\paragraph{39} We must not think that on account of the multitude of bodies a
multitude of souls were produced, but that before bodies there were many and
one, without the one and universal's preventing the many from being in it, nor
the many's dividing the one among them. They are distinct without being
sundered, or having divided up the universal soul among them. And they are
present to each other without being confounded, or making the universal soul an
agglomeration: for they are neither separated by limits, nor again are they
confounded; just as the sciences (knowledges), though many, are not confounded
in one soul. Again, they do not inhere, as bodies do in soul, with a difference
of es\-sence. But they are a kind of energies of the soul; for the nature of
the soul is of infinite power, and throughout every particular of it, it is
soul; and they are all one, and, again, the universal soul is other than they
all. For as bodies, when divided \textit{ad infinitum}, do not finally merge
into the incorporeal, having their difference in the mere mass (bulk) of the
parts, so the soul, being a vital form, includes forms \textit{ad infinitum}.
For the differences which it contains are specific ones, and the universal soul
is with or without these. If there were anything like action in it, there would
be otherness, while sameness remained. But if, in the case of bodies in which
otherness prevails more than sameness, nothing incorporeal being superinduced
broke the union, but all [parts] remained united according to their es\-sence,
but distinct as regards qualities and other determinations, what must be said
and supposed in the case of specific, incorporeal life, in the case of which
identity has prevailed over otherness, and nothing is hypostatized foreign to
the form, and from which arises unity in bodies. And not even body when it is
added to it breaks the union, although, as regards its energies, it hampers it
in many respects. But its identity itself, through itself, does and discovers
all things by means of its \textit{ad infinitum} specific energy, although each
individual part is capable of all things when it is purified from bodies, just
as each individual particle of seed has the power of the whole seed. And as
seed contained in matter is contained in proportion to the capability of each
individual in the seeds [parts] of matter, and everything that is drawn
together within the power of the seed has the whole power of it in each of its
parts; so, also, that which is thought under the form of a part of the
immaterial soul has the power of the whole soul. But that which has inclined to
matter, though receiving the form to which it has inclined, will also be
capable of associating with an immaterial form even if it meets with matter in
itself, when, withdrawing from the material, it reverts to itself. And since,
when inclining to matter, it experiences a lack of all things, and an emptying
of its own individual power, and when carried up into intellect, it experiences
possession of the fullness of itself according to the power of the whole, those
who first recognized this fullness of the soul, enigmatically called the former
Poverty, the latter Plenty, and with reason.

\paragraph{40} The ancients, wishing to exhibit the nature of incorporeal
being, as far as possible, in words, when they had called it one, immediately
added [that it was also] all things, such as the things cognized by the senses
are individually. But when we had reflected that this one is diverse, not
seeing in the perceptible this whole as One, or that it is all, in the same
sense that it is one, from the fact of the All's being the One itself, they
added ``the One in as far as it is one,'' in order that we might think
being-all-things, when predicated of being, as an incomposite somewhat, and
might be rid of [the idea of] agglomeration. And when they have said it was
everywhere, they add that it is nowhere. And when they say it is in all things,
and in each individual capable of receiving it sufficiently, they add that it
is whole in whole. And generally they express it by means of the most
contradictory terms, putting these together in order that we may eliminate from
it those conceptions modelled upon bodies which obscure the characteristic
properties of being.

\paragraph{41} When you grasp an eternal es\-sence infinite in itself in the
extent of its power, and begin to think a substance unwearied, unabating,
nowhere deficient, raised aloft in the most utter life, full of itself,
situated within itself, sated from itself, and not seeking even itself; [and]
if you add to this the [notion of] place or of relation, by the diminution
[arising] from lack of place or from relation, you have not at the same time
diminished it. On the contrary, \textit{you} have swerved (deserted), taking as
a cloak the obtrusive imagination of the reflection. For, such a thing you will
neither exceed or go beyond, nor will you give it position or dependence, nor
will you diminish it even to a small extent, since it can part with nothing in
a process of gradual diminution. For it is more unceasing (inexhaustible) than
all fountains, being the ever-flowing, thinking, and incessant. If you cannot
encounter it directly, you will not, by comparison of it to all things, be
making any inquiry about being. Or if you do make any such inquiry, you will
miss your mark and look at something else. But if you make no search, taking
your stand upon yourself and your own es\-sence, you will be assimilated to the
all, and will not be contained in any of the things that are [derived] from it.
And if the All is not limited, neither are you; for, having put away
limitation, you have become all. Notwithstanding you were all even before: nay,
even something was added to you besides the all. And you became less by the
addition, because the addition was not of being. For to it you can add nothing.
When, therefore, space is produced from non-being, it is accompanied with
poverty, and is lacking in all things. When, however, it puts away non-being,
then it is itself all fulness of self. So that [...] recovers itself, putting
away the things that have degraded and belittled it; and particularly when one
supposes himself to be the things which are small by their nature, and not what
he is in truth. He revolted from himself at the same time when he revolted from
being. But when anyone is present to his present self, then he is present to
being which is everywhere. And when he let go himself he revolted also from it.
Of such value is it to be present with that which is present in self, and
absent from that which is outside of self. If being is present with us,
non-being is absent; but while we are with other things, it is not present with
us. It did not come to be present; but we depart when it is not present. And
what is strange in this? For you, by being present, are not absent from self;
and [yet] you are not present with self, though present; present and absent
being the same when you look at other things, and neglect to look at yourself.
And, if thus, while present to self, you are not present, and for this reason
are ignorant of yourself, and discover those things which are present to you
and yet far from you, rather than the self which is by nature present to you,
why do you wonder if the not present is far from you, who have become far from
it, by becoming far from yourself? For the more you belong to yourself,
although present and undisjoined (for self is in proportion as it belongs to
itself), the more you will belong to it, which is thus indeed inseparable from
you in its es\-sence as you are from yourself. Thus it is in your power to know
exhaustively what is present to being and what is absent from being, which is
present everywhere and again is nowhere. For to those who are able to retire
intellectually into their own es\-sence, and to cognize their own es\-sence,
and in this cognition and knowledge of cognition to recover themselves in the
identity of the cognizing and the cognized, to those, being present with
themselves, being also is present. But from those who go beyond their own being
to other things, inasmuch as they are absent from themselves, being also is
absent. And although we are so constituted as to be placed in the same
es\-sence, and to enrich ourselves from ourselves, and not to depart to that
which we are not, and to be impoverished of ourselves, and through these again
to be mated with poverty, even when self is present; yet, while we are not
separated from being either by place or es\-sence, or cut off from it by
anything else, we separate ourselves from it by adversion to non-being, and
accordingly pay this penalty, that, by turning away from being, we turn away
from ourselves and are ignorant of ourselves. On the other hand, by adverting
to love of ourselves, we recover ourselves and are united to God. Hence it has
been well said that the soul is enclosed in the body as in a kind of prison,
and that it is there bound with chains as runaway slaves are wont to be. Now it
must strive to loose itself from these chains. Inasmuch as it has turned to the
here, and deserted its divine self, it is, as Plato says, a fugitive and a
wanderer from God. Every evil life is full of slavery, and hence is godless
and unjust. There is in it a spirit full of impiety, and hence of
unrighteousness. Wherefore it has rightly been said that by self-determination
it finds the just, and that in awarding to each of one's fellows his due lies
an image and shadow of true righteousness.

\paragraph{42} That which has its being in another, and which has no es\-sence
in itself apart from another, if it turns to itself in order to cognize itself
apart from that in which it has its es\-sence, separating itself from that, is
itself corrupted and destroyed, inasmuch as it withdraws itself from being. But
that which is capable of knowing itself without that in which it is, when it
recovers itself from itself, and is capable of doing this without destruction
of itself, cannot possibly have its es\-sence in that from which it is able to
turn itself away without destruction of itself, and to cognize itself without
that. Now if seeing and all perceptive power, neither is a perception of self,
nor when separating itself from the body, lays hold of itself, or is preserved;
while intellect, when separating itself from the body, then acts most
intellectually, and turns to itself and is not destroyed; it is plain that the
perceptive powers possess their energy through the body, whereas the intellect
does not possess its energy or its being in the body, but in itself.

\paragraph{43} Incorporeal things are named and thought accurately by negation
of body, as matter, according to the ancients, and the form of matter, when
thought separate from matter, and natures and powers; so also space, and time,
and limits. For all these things are named by negation of body. But besides
these there are other things which are by an abuse of language called
incorporeal, not from negation of body, but because it is altogether contrary
to their nature to beget body. Wherefore that which has reference to what is
first indicated, exists in relation to bodies; whereas those which have
reference to the second, are completely distinct from bodies, and from the
incorporeal things which have relation to bodies. For bodies are in space, and
limits are in body. But intellect and intellectual reason exist neither in
space nor in body. They neither immediately posit body, nor are posited by
body, or by the things which are called incorporeal from negation of body. And
though, for example, a void can be thought as incorporeal, it is not possible
for intellect to be in a void. For the void would be receptive of body. But it
is impossible to separate energy from intellect, or to give space to energy. As
the \textit{Genus} appears double, one phase of it the disciples of Zeno do not
accept at all; whereas, accepting the other, and observing that the first is
not similar, they cancel it, instead of regarding it, as they ought to do, as a
different genus. Because it is not the other, they ought not to regard it as
not being at all.

\paragraph{44} Intellect and intelligible are one thing, perception and
perceptible another. With intellect is correlated the intelligible, and with
perception the perceptible. But neither perception seizes itself by itself, nor
does the perceptible. And the intelligible being the correlate of intellect,
the intelligible also falls in the sphere of intellect, and by no means under
that of perception. But the intelligible falls in the sphere of intellect. If,
therefore, intellect is intelligible and not perceptible, it must be an
intelligible. And if it is intelligible by intellect and not by perception, it
must be an intelligent. The same [intellect], therefore, which is the subject
and object of intelligence is the whole of a whole, and does not stand in the
relation of rubber and rubbed. It is not, therefore, thought with one part,
while it thinks with another [i.~e.~one part is not the object, another the
subject of intelligence]. For it is indivisible, and the whole is intelligible
to the whole. And it is intellect throughout, having no knowledge of absence of
intelligence in itself. Hence, not one part of it thinks, while the other does
not think; for in so far as it does not think, it will be unintelligible. Nor
does it withdraw from one thing and pass to another thing. For that from which
it withdraws, it ceases to be able to think. But if it is not true that one
thing after another is within its range, it thinks all things at once. Since,
therefore, it thinks all things at once, and not one thing now and another
then, it thinks all things now and forever at once [i.~e.~in one eternal
\textit{now}]. If, therefore, the now belongs to it, the past and the future
are removed from it, in this spaceless, present, timeless self-possession. So
that the together (simultaneity), as regards both multitude and temporal
distance, belong to it. Wherefore all things are as one, and in one---a One
spaceless, timeless. This being the case, there is also no whence [or] whither
for intellect, and hence also no movement; but energy as one, in one, free from
increase and change and all evolution. But if multiplicity is as one, and
energy is also timeless, a subordinate attribute of such an es\-sence must be
being-always-in-one. But this is eternity. Wherefore an attribute of intellect
is eternity. But to that which does not think as one in one, but discursively
and in movement, and in leaving one thing and seizing another, and in dividing
and going-beyond, there belongs the attribute of time. For such movement
presupposes a future and a past. Soul, for example, passes from one thing to
another, taking up concept after concept, not because the first disappear, or
that the second introduce themselves from elsewhere; but the one set have as it
were departed while they remain in it, and others as it were are succeeding
from elsewhere. But they do not come from without, but from its self-movement
of itself into itself, and its passing of its eye over the things which it has
part by part. For it is like a fountain whose waters do not flow away, but
which spouts up what it contains in a circle into itself. Now the movement of
this presupposes time; whereas the enduring of intellect in itself demands
eternity, not separated from it as time is from soul. In the former the
presuppositions are united. That which moves counterfeits eternity, by the mere
immeasurableness of its movement producing an impression of eternity. And also
that which endures, in relation to that which moves, counterfeits time, going
beyond and multiplying as it were its now-there (everlasting present there) in
imitation of time. For this reason, some have thought that time could be
regarded as at rest, no less than as in motion, and eternity, as we have said,
as infinite time. Thus the one imparts its own properties (conditions) to the
other, the moving always copying eternity from the stable, as if eternity were
identical with its own Always (unceasing duration); and the stable, in the
identity of its energy, connecting time with its own enduring, from the energy.
Further, in perceptible things, distinct time is one for one thing, another for
another. For example, it is one for the Sun, another for the Moon, another for
Venus, and so forth. Hence one has one year, another another. And the year that
includes these is consummated in the motion of the soul, inasmuch as all other
things move in imitation of it. The movement of it being different from the
movement of these, the time also of it is different from the time of these. The
latter is extended both as regards locomotion and transition.

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